Synthesis, structure, ADME and biological activity of three 2,6-disubstituted thiosemicarbazone derivatives.

Three new 2,6-disubstituted thiosemicarbazone derivatives of pyridine, namely, 2-{amino[6-(pyrrolidin-1-yl)pyridin-2-yl]methylidene}-N,N-dimethylhydrazine-1-carbothioamide, C13H20N6S, 2-{amino[6-(piperidin-1-yl)pyridin-2-yl]methylidene}-N,N-dimethylhydrazine-1-carbothioamide, C14H22N6S, and 2-[amino(6-phenoxypyridin-2-yl)methylidene]-N,N-dimethylhydrazine-1-carbothioamide monohydrate, C15H17N5OS·H2O, have been synthesized and characterized by NMR spectroscopy and low-temperature single-crystal X-ray diffraction. In addition, their antibacterial and anti-yeast activities have been determined. The ability of the tested compounds to inhibit bacterial growth was comparable to vancomycin as a reference drug. Compared to isoniazid (MIC 0.125 and 8 µg ml-1), the compounds showed the ability to inhibit the growth of Mycobacterium tuberculosis to a moderate degree for the standard strain and at the same level or higher (MIC 4-8 µg ml-1) for the resistant strain. All three compounds adopt the zwitterionic form in the crystal structure regardless of the presence or absence of solvent molecules.

Structure and Microbiological Activity of 1H-benzo[d]imidazole Derivatives.

Three new crystal structures of 1H-benzo[d]imidazole derivatives were determined. In the structures of these compounds, an identical system of hydrogen bonds, C(4), was observed. Solid-state NMR was applied for testing the quality of the obtained samples. All of these compounds were tested for in vitro antibacterial activity against Gram-positive bacteria and Gram-negative bacteria, as well as antifungal activity, by checking their selectivity. ADME calculations indicate that the compounds can be tested as potential drugs.

Stochastic stability in three-player games.

Animal behavior and evolution can often be described by game-theoretic models. Although in many situations the number of players is very large, their strategic interactions are usually decomposed into a sum of two-player games. Only recently were evolutionarily stable strategies defined for multi-player games and their properties analyzed [Broom, M., Cannings, C., Vickers, G.T., 1997. Multi-player matrix games. Bull. Math. Biol. 59, 931-952]. Here we study the long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of populations of randomly matched individuals playing symmetric three-player games. We analyze the stochastic stability of equilibria in games with multiple evolutionarily stable strategies. We also show that, in some games, a population may not evolve in the long run to an evolutionarily stable equilibrium.